Why legislators must step back from managing NG-CDF kitty

It is a fundamental tenet of constitutional democracy that the powers of governance—legislative, executive, and judicial—must remain distinct. This principle, enshrined in the Constitution, is not a matter of theory or convenience; it is the backbone of accountable government. Yet, this principle continues to be violated, most glaringly in the management of the National Government Constituencies Development Fund (NG-CDF).

At its core, the NG-CDF is an executive function. It involves the disbursement, allocation, and expenditure of public funds on development projects such as classrooms, health centres, and water points. These are quintessential executive tasks—functions that fall squarely within the mandate of the national and county governments. The Constitution assigns Parliament the responsibility to legislate, represent, and, crucially, to oversee the executive’s implementation of public policy and use of public resources. This is what makes the involvement of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the management of NG-CDF both unconstitutional and dangerous.

By sitting on NG-CDF committees, influencing project selection, and often determining contractors or beneficiaries, MPs blur the constitutional lines between oversight and execution. In essence, they become both player and referee—allocating funds on the one hand, then purporting to scrutinise their own actions on the other. This fusion of roles creates a vacuum of accountability and opens the door wide to abuse, mismanagement, and corruption.

The courts have not been silent on this matter. In multiple rulings, the High Court and the Supreme Court have affirmed that MPs have no business managing public funds. The 2015 High Court ruling, for instance, declared the CDF Act unconstitutional on the basis that it violated the separation of powers. While the Act was later amended to create the NG-CDF and shift some functions to a board, the underlying issue remains unresolved: MPs still exercise considerable influence over how the funds are used in their constituencies.

The logic behind keeping lawmakers away from the purse strings is simple and compelling. Parliament exists to check and balance the executive. If legislators are allowed to execute functions they are supposed to monitor, they lose the moral and institutional authority to hold others to account. How can a Public Accounts Committee effectively query the misuse of NG-CDF funds when its own members have been part of the problem?

Supporters of the NG-CDF often argue that the fund brings development closer to the people, especially in underserved areas. That may be true. But development must never come at the expense of constitutional order. What is required is not the elimination of grassroots development funding, but the proper structuring of such initiatives within the constitutional framework.

There is no shortage of ways to achieve this. The executive arm of government, through line ministries and agencies, can administer constituency development funds with input—but not control—from elected representatives. MPs can and should play a consultative role, articulating the priorities of their constituents and ensuring that public funds are spent effectively. What they must not do is sit at the same table where spending decisions are made, contracts awarded, or funds disbursed.

The dangers of MPs managing NG-CDF funds are not merely academic. Numerous audit reports have raised concerns about misappropriation, stalled or ghost projects, inflated costs, and nepotistic contracting practices. Where accountability mechanisms are weak, impunity thrives. Constituents are often left powerless, as the very person meant to represent their interests and scrutinise spending becomes the de facto manager of the funds.

This is also a question of political integrity. How can we preach good governance and accountability when our laws allow elected leaders to be both custodian and consumer of public resources? We cannot build a transparent system when checks and balances are deliberately undermined by political convenience.

The time has come to decisively reform the NG-CDF. Parliament must voluntarily cede control of the fund’s implementation. The executive should take up its rightful role through devolved structures and independent bodies. Parliament’s role should be to set broad development policy, approve budgets, and demand answers where things go wrong—not to administer projects or select contractors.

To those MPs who argue that without NG-CDF they would be unable to deliver development to their people, we must remind them: development is not a favour or a personal achievement. It is a right owed to every Kenyan by the government they pay taxes to. The role of an MP is not to build classrooms or dig boreholes—it is to pass laws that make these things happen, and to ensure that those charged with implementation do so efficiently and honestly.

The Constitution was designed to move the country away from personalised, opaque, and unaccountable governance. Allowing MPs to manage NG-CDF funds is a direct betrayal of that vision. It is not just a procedural flaw—it is a systemic failure that must be corrected.

For Kenya to advance as a constitutional democracy, we must take the doctrine of separation of powers seriously. We must stop allowing political actors to cherry-pick which constitutional principles to honour and which to ignore. And we must insist that those who legislate must not execute. Only then will we have a system where development is not tied to patronage, and where public funds serve the people—not the political class.