How Shabaab networks use Kenya to import terror kits

Al Shabaab militants are using at least nine companies to import drones, VHF radios, military camouflage and other terror-related cargo from China through Kenya.

Security sources on Thursday said the militia uses the cargo companies’ employees to ship the consignments to Dhobley in Somalia and finally to Buale, Jilib, the de facto capital of the Islamic Emirate of Somalia controlled by the terror group.

“Though there is collaboration, relationships and synergy among security agencies in both internal and foreign operations. We still have cases of the enemy within that has led to cases where such consignments are cleared all the way to the terror group bases,” said a senior government official.

According to an intelligence report seen by The Standard, the logistics companies have previously been linked to facilitation of Al Shabaab equipment from China through Eastleigh.

One of the firms, according to the Registrar of Companies, was registered on July 13, 2004, and another on November 15, 2015. However, there were no records at the Registrar of Companies regarding three other companies.

The intercepted items include communication equipment, drones with capabilities of modification to carry payloads for attack, drugs and medical equipment, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and GIS and mapping tools, according to the report.

To further conceal the cargo, some consignments are consolidated at the countries of export and are easily cleared and collected by owners without being deconsolidated at the Port of Mombasa.

Under the East African Customs Management Act, 2004, it is an offence to make a false declaration.

“The probe has revealed that some cargo companies are unwitting accomplices who are not part of the criminal chain but only fail to carry out sufficient due diligence,” said a source familiar with the investigations.

Apart from the cargo companies, four clearing firms in Mombasa and at least five financial institutions in both Nairobi and Mombasa have also been implicated.

By yesterday, at least 10 officials from these institutions had been grilled by the detectives but their identities have not been revealed.

According to a recent report, the security and intelligence agencies have intercepted at least 10 Al Shabaab consignments.

Detectives have also revealed that Violet Kemunto, the wife of the DusitD2 terror attack mastermind Ali Salim Gichunge, has also been using two of the cargo companies under investigations.

On Tuesday night, detectives recovered 725 full camouflage uniforms and 240 T-shirts belonging to the Al Shabaab in Eastleigh. They had intercepted 25 bales of uniforms the previous day. 

According to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), the consignment was sent to Abdi Hakim, who is currently in custody in Dhobley, and had been transported via a parcels company located along 12th Street, Eastleigh.

Preliminary investigations indicate that the consignment was shipped as consolidated cargo from China through Mombasa.

“Investigations quickly unravelled a complex network. The intercepted consignment had reportedly been destined for a suspect identified as Abdi Hakim, who remains in custody in Dhobley,” said the DCI.

Detectives said several key suspects are in custody even as the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and other security agencies pursue additional leads and possible accomplices.

Although the government has adopted a multi-agency approach in tackling terror and other security threats, reports indicate that collusion and complacency has seen imports for the terror group cleared at the port, taken to Eastleigh in Nairobi before being transferred to Somalia.

The terror group has employed a variety of smuggling and financial obfuscation techniques.

In February this year, the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) froze the assets of Kemunto and 12 other individuals suspected of links to terrorism financing, directing banks and other institutions to immediately halt any transactions involving the listed persons.

The designations were made following a decision by the Counter Financing of Terrorism Inter-Ministerial Committee, established under Section 40D of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2012.

“She is part of a cross-border facilitation network supporting Al-Shabaab operations in Somalia. She was also linked to the Dusit D2 Hotel 2019 attack,” the FRC said.

Sources said other consignments from Somalia are often mislabeled to conceal their origin.

A common smuggling route involves vessels arriving in Somalia carrying sugar and departing with charcoal, thereby creating a two-way illicit trade corridor.

The financial proceeds from these exports are typically deposited in Gulf State banks and rerouted back to Al-Shabaab through import-export businesses and front companies, according to a recent report.

The militants have a comprehensive financial structure to support its activities across Somalia and beyond and at the same time use obfuscation tactics to conceal the origins, flow and use of their funds. The funds, according to security reports, are used for service provision, salaries, military operations, other logistics and recruitment.

The officers recovered 11 bales, each containing 60 full camouflage uniforms and 120 T-shirts.

Another bale was also recovered containing 65 uniforms alongside 120 T-shirts at Vision Point Express, a neighbouring facility, where they had been temporarily stored due to limited space at Gaani Parcel Express.

“Preliminary findings indicate that the manager of Gaani Parcel Express, Omar Elmi Issack, had arranged for the temporary storage of the consignment after receiving it from an individual identified as Sharif,” the DCI said.

The larger batch, of 37 bales, is believed to have been imported by Safe Link Cargo located at Soma Towers, and was coordinated and cleared by the company’s employee, Abdiftah Sharif.

“The cargo is reported to have originated from China and entered the country through the Port of Mombasa under the guise of consolidated shipments,” the DCI said.

Investigators also established connections between Abdiftah, Sharif, and another individual identified as Abdikadir, forming a critical chain in the suspected supply network.

According to the records, the consignment was collected on April 4 by Sharif before being dispatched to Gaani Parcel Express.

Detectives said several key suspects are currently in custody even as ATPU detectives and other security agencies pursue additional leads and possible accomplices.

Though the government has adopted a multi-agency and collaborative approach to tackling terror and other security threats, reports indicate that collusion and complacency has led to similar cases where imports for the terror group are cleared from the ports, taken to Eastleigh in Nairobi before they are transferred to Somalia.

The terror group has employed a variety of smuggling and financial obfuscation techniques.

In February this year, the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) froze the assets of Kemunto and 12 other individuals suspected of links to terrorism financing, directing banks and other institutions to immediately halt any transactions involving the listed persons.

The designations were made following a decision by the Counter Financing of Terrorism Inter-Ministerial Committee, established under Section 40D of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2012.

“She is part of a cross-border facilitation network supporting Al-Shabaab operations in Somalia. She was also linked to the Dusit D2 Hotel 2019 attack,” the FRC said.

Sources said other consignments from Somalia are often mislabeled to conceal their origin.

A common smuggling route involves vessels arriving in Somalia carrying sugar and departing with charcoal, thereby creating a two-way illicit trade corridor.

The financial proceeds from these exports are typically deposited in Gulf State banks and rerouted back to Al-Shabaab through import-export businesses and front companies, according to a recent report.

The militants have a comprehensive financial structure to support its activities across Somalia and beyond and at the same time use obfuscation tactics to conceal the origins, flow and use of their funds. The funds, according to security reports, are used for service provision, salaries, military operations, other logistics and recruitment.