Mudavadi plays Russian roulette in address to House after Moscow trip

National
By Wellingtone Nyongesa | Apr 06, 2026

Prime CS Musalia Mudavadi before the Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Foreign Relations at Parliament, March 2, 2026. [Boniface Okendo, Standard]

When Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi looked the people’s representatives in the eye and referred to Russia’s war against Ukraine as a “Special Military Operation,” he was playing into the legendary Russian propaganda machine that many observers have long warned against.

From downplaying the number of Kenyans killed while serving in Russia, to citing Kenya’s Penal Code Section 68, which criminalises joining a foreign army, and using a euphemism coined and enforced by President Vladimir Putin, Mudavadi was effectively echoing a narrative designed to obscure the reality of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

When Putin launched a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, he followed it with laws requiring the use of “Special Military Operation” in reference to the war. The order, whose Russian initials translate as SVO, implied a limited operation that would not affect most Russians’ daily lives.

It also criminalised criticism of the invasion, with long prison terms for those who “discredited” the armed forces or spread “false information,” Reuters reported on March 22, 2024.

Kuala Lumpur-based Chasseur Group, an international security and war research firm, describes Russia as a hub of self-aggrandising narratives and controlled messaging, often far removed from realities on the ground. The Kremlin has a powerful fulcrum called the Presidential Administration of Russia, whose extra role is to shape narratives and influence all government departments and media.

“The argument is that Russia does not fight wars. It just conducts operations because wars can only be fought by belligerents who are on equal terms. Russia is not equal to Ukraine and cannot engage in a war with it- it is claimed”. Munira Mustafa, Chasseur Group Executive Director and lead consultant, told The Standard.

“Calling it a special military operation uses the logic of policing, more like a police operation, which removes it from all references as a real military confrontation,” he added.

During Mudavadi’s trip to Moscow, all Russian officials who accompanied his counterpart Sergey Lavrov did not at any moment describe the protracted conflict as a war. This appeared to have rubbed off on Mudavadi, who, during his two sessions, one at the National Assembly and another at the Senate last week, kept borrowing from Putin’s orders rather than using the terminology employed by the United Nations and European Union.

A week after the invasion, the UN formally recognised the Russian aggression as a war, passing Resolution ES-11/1 on March 2, 2022, deploring Putin’s invasion, and demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces and reversal of the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk, territories of Ukraine.

Vienna-based human rights group Freedom for Eurasia, which documents political repression, authoritarianism, transnational persecution, and kleptocratic networks across Central Asia and Eurasia, told The Standard that Russia disproportionately mobilises men from economically marginalised regions, both within the Russian Federation and the Global South. Strict control over messaging ensures that frontline casualties remain obscured.

This “self-cleaning” approach was evident in Lavrov’s remarks during his meeting with Mudavadi on March 16: “All Kenyans, as well as citizens from other countries who sign contracts to take part in the Special Military Operation, did so voluntarily. Upon expiry of these contracts, they do not need to be repatriated; they can do as they wish. They can terminate the contract at any time.”

“Over the past decade, and especially since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a clear pattern in how Russia mobilises human resources for its wars,” said Leila Seitbek, founder of Freedom for Eurasia.

“The burden of frontline combat falls disproportionately on men from economically marginalised and politically peripheral regions, mostly non-ethnic Russians. Republics, such as Buryatia, Dagestan, Tuva, and Ingushetia, have recorded significantly higher casualty rates than major urban centres, such as Moscow or St Petersburg.”

Disposable soldiers

Seitbek added that this reflects a broader structure in which marginalised populations, within Russian republics, Asia, and Africa, are instrumentalised as disposable manpower, raising concerns under international humanitarian and human rights law, including prohibitions on coercion, ill-treatment, and discriminatory practices in armed conflict.

Three years into the war with Ukraine, the Kremlin faced a crisis it refused to acknowledge: Russia could not sustain the conflict using its own soldiers without risking political upheaval or economic collapse, Munira Mustafa said.

In 2025, Putin signed a decree expanding recruitment to Africa, Central Asia, and South America, without a clear legal framework. 

“Mass mobilisation was politically risky after the September 2022 call-up triggered the exodus of over 261,000 Russians. Putin needed a third option. In July 2025, he allowed foreigners to serve, but the decree did not specify recruitment methods. This effectively enabled Russian trafficking agencies to operate across Africa, Asia, and South America.”

In 2024, Reuters noted that the notion that Russia is not engaged in a real war had become unsustainable, given high casualties, increased defence spending, military production, and Ukrainian strikes deep into Russian territory. Putin continues to label the conflict as SVO, portraying it as an existential struggle akin to the Soviet fight against Nazi Germany, blaming the West for using Ukraine to wage a proxy war.

References to the war as a mere military operation, undercounting foreign casualties, and attributing deaths to voluntary contracts remain central to Russia’s strategic messaging. Families of Kenyans trapped in Russia expressed outrage at Mudavadi’s report to parliament, which stated three Kenyans were dead, 16 missing, and 38 injured, while a total of 252 Kenyans were trapped.

In reality, families report more than 40 presumed deaths, with hundreds of Kenyans witnessing frontline deployment firsthand.

In a joint statement, civil society group Vocal Africa and families said: “We have watched in disbelief as our sons, seeking opportunities, were placed in harm’s way, treated as expendables, and left without protection. We have cried, appealed, and demanded intervention,” said Bibiana Waithaka, whose son Charles Waithaka was reportedly killed by a landmine in Russia.

In what has aggrieved many families, Mudavadi told parliament that Kenyans serving in Russia’s war signed contracts while fully aware of what they were getting into. “The indications are that the majority of the recruited Kenyans signed their contracts fully aware of the tasks, responsibilities and dangers, some even sadly, but jokingly mentioning ‘kukufa ni dakika moja’ (Dying takes a minute), meaning they totally understood the risks involved,” he said.

However, The Standard possesses testimonies from those unaware of the contracts’ contents, written in Russian and only revealed via Google Translate after arrival.

A returnee, who wished to remain anonymous, said: “When Global Face listed me to go to Russia in May last year, the job promise was construction work. After arrival, about 20 of us were ordered not to ask questions, led to offices, and signed documents in Russian. We were then sent to an abandoned house, and only then told we were soldiers.”

The first reported Kenyan death, Martin Macharia Mburu, a former matatu driver from Ruaka, sent a letter to his family via Kenya’s mission in Moscow: “…According to the contract offered before departure, I was to perform security, cooking, or driving work. Upon arrival, I discovered I would be issued a firearm and deployed to the frontline in Ukraine, which was not stated in my contract or agreed work…”

“I have no military or police background, did not travel to Russia for armed conflict, and fear for my safety. I request urgent intervention from the Kenyan Embassy.”

Martin was dispatched to the warfront and killed in Russian-held Donetsk on November 30.

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